discourse.1 Our position grows out of this larger effort. In the most basic terms, we are arguing that the question of popular culture in Palestine and Israel is fundamentally one of politics and power. We further suggest that the marginalization of popular culture within progressive scholarship on the region is symptomatic of the conceptual and methodological limits that still define much of this scholarship.
What we offer in this essay is less an illustration of precisely how such analytics might be rethought than a polemic about theform that alternative scholarly projects might take through recourse to popular culture.2 This polemic emerges out of, even as it speaks back to, the tradition of radical scholarship on Palestine, Israel, and the history of Zionism-by which we mean scholarship that has been framed by questions of colonization, occupation, and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination.3 In turning scholarly attention to the field of popular culture, our aim is to broaden understanding of the terrain of power in Palestine and Israel and thereby the possible arenas and modalities of struggle.
HEGEMONIC PARADIGMS
The field of scholarship on Palestine and Israel has changed dramatically over the last few decades. The changes are not in political idiom alone. Rather, a new generation of scholars has begun to take up historical questions that "move beyond the narrowly political to explore the social, economic, and cultural histories of each community."4 These scholars, situated mainly in anthropology and literary studies, have begun to focus on new objects of analysis and to rethink questions of power and knowledge through critical and poststructural theory.5 Yet despite such innovations and despite the growing strength of a radical, decolonizing voice within the field, Left scholarship is still dominated by relatively traditional analytic paradigms. We want to suggest that the marginality of popular culture within these literatures is merely symptomatic of the narrow theory of politics and power at work in these paradigms.
What, then, are these paradigms, and what stories of power do they tell? In our estimation, two paradigms continue to dominate Left scholarship on Palestine and Israel within the U.S. academy-paradigms that are imbricated and often articulate through each other. The first could be termed the national paradigm, and the second the Marxist historiographical and/or political economic paradigm. The former is characterized by a scholarly narrative that installs the nation and/or nation-state as the inherent logic guiding the critical analysis (that is, Palestine and/or Israel). In this paradigm, the nation-state figures as both politically determinative and largely enclosed and discrete. Perhaps remarkably, this paradigm remains active both within scholarship that canvasses the international dimension and scholarship that addresses internal heterogeneity within the nation-state-along the lines, for example, of ethnonational difference (notably, Palestinian citizens of Israel)6 and gender. In turn, while the notion of Diaspora (both Jewish and Palestinian) has been prominent in this paradigm, it largely functions as a sign of separation from the national rather than as an analytic tool for deterritorializing the nation-state. While the Marxist model may complicate the narrative of national conflict through attention to political economy, it tends to retain the dyadic model of Israel versus Palestine, albeit configured as a struggle over control of the state and the means of production. The presence of an international dimension in the Marxist model proceeds according to the logic of class or economic determinism (and, we noted above, often works to reinscribe the nation-state logic).7
Rather infrequently discussed by scholars in Middle East studies, although heavily debated in other fields,8 is the rather limited theory of politics and/or power that both these paradigms presume. In both, power is understood in relatively monolithic terms, and its location is presumed to be relatively singular-taking shape in the state (Israeli) and/or the ruling classes. In the Marxist paradigm, power is rooted primarily in control of the economy, with class struggle understood as the primary locus of political action. In the nationstate model, control of the economy is coupled with control of territory and the coercive and administrative bases of state power (military, police, judiciary, bureaucracy, etc.). What these frameworks share is a notion of power as something that can be "held" or at least potentially grasped. The nature of progressive political action is likewise seen as locatable and relatively singular-cohering in the practices of disenfranchised communities and actors, be they Palestinian or Israeli, and aimed explicitly at the creation or defense of the state and/or nation. Both frameworks presume a binary notion of struggle, revolving around the poles of domination and resistance, variously configured.
Cultural practices, objects, and circuits sometimes have a place within these scholarly frameworks, but in highly circumscribed ways.9 More often than not, the relative importance of culture is directly proportional to its perceived ability to reflect, serve, and/or exemplify the political, either in the instrumental service of hegemony or when deployed as a weapon in political struggles. This has been particularly true in literature on Palestine, where much of the attention accorded to resistance culture (notably poetry, folk dance, and graffiti) has turned on its ability either to mobilize the masses or to reflect broader oppositional efforts.10 A similar logic accounts for the proliferation of scholarly work on early Zionist culture (for example the literature on Shirei Eretz Yisrael, or Songs of the Land of Israel)-scholarship that has explored the crucial role of song in building Hebrew character and collective identity in the early state era.l1 Yet in much of this scholarship, culture is positioned as an effect of broader processes and forms, or in peripheral relation to (or as a symptom of) the wider "context." And if expressive culture has figured only marginally in this literature, popular culture has been perceived as even more insignificant. This is due, we hypothesize, to assumptions made about the nature of the commodity-the form taken by much popular culture. Lurking here is the influence of deterministic Marxist arguments about the ways in which commodification and mass production effectively denude culture of its political role or potential, even as commodities are deployed as tools with which to control the "stupefied" and consuming masses.12 When coupled with the scholarly agenda of the national narrative, the problem of the commodity form becomes more intransigent still. The fact that culture as commodity is frequently produced and circulated through global circuits and interests is often thought to endow it with a troubled, even treasonous, relation to national interests and struggle agendas.
For 
THE TURN TO CULTURAL POLmCS
Where, then, might one look for alternatives? In rethinking the theoretical limits within Palestine and Israel scholarship, we begin by turning to the work of the Birmingham school-also known as British cultural studies-particularly to the work of Stuart Hall and his critical engagement with the writings of Antonio Gramsci. What one encounters in Hall's work is a persistent concern with questions of culturalpolitics, that is, an insistence on culture as a crucial terrain of both power and struggle that "articulates" with broader social forces and political economic processes. In Hall's account, by contrast to the rigid structural determinism of orthodox Marxism, culture has no singular location or function, nor are subcultural or popular cultural forces or actors necessarily inscribed with counterhegemonic meanings or effects. Rather, the terrain of the cultural is contradictory and changeable, "always capable of being dearticulated and rearticulated."13 It should be noted that even as British cultural studies has historically rejected both the class determinism and the base/superstructure dyad of orthodox Marxism, it has nonetheless remained within the problematic of Marxism in its attention to the ways in which culture articulates with the "materialities of power and inequality" in differently situated communities.
For scholars of the Birmingham school, the interest in explicitlypopular cultural forms has not been incidental. Rather, the turn to the popular has been a crucial component of their attempt to rethink classical Marxist paradigms and analytics with a view toward expanding the terrain of what constitutes power and struggle. So, too, have they striven to think beyond the high/low dyad that had characterized much previous cultural scholarship.14 As Raymond Williams has suggested, "popular culture" was theorized by cultural studies in contradistinction both to "high culture" (with its attendant notions of bourgeois self-cultivation) and to "folk culture" (with its cultural authenticity and imagined location "outside of the corrupting influences").15 And unlike the terms on either side of this imagined cultural dyad (high/low), at issue was a notion of culture stripped of rigid class location and determining function.
Rather, popular culture was thought to "articulate" through multiple and sometimes contradictory modalities of difference and power (e.g., class, gender, ethnonationality, religion, and place). Nor was it thought to bear a stable political valence (i.e., no inherently counter-hegemonic or minoritarian politics), but instead, to enunciate in changeable ways that were always subject to reinscription. As Tony Bennet has argued, the unfixed nature of "popular culture" has frustrated attempts at rigid definition. Instead, popular culture (he argues) "can only be defined abstractly as a site-[as it is] always changing and variable in its constitution and organization."'6 Even in the absence of rigid definitions, scholars of the Birmingham school have long insisted on the crucial importance of popular culture in modern mass-mediated societies as a site in and through which people's commonsense interpretations of the world and of their own identities are constructed.17
As we have noted, theories of popular culture advanced by scholars of the Birmingham school have relied heavily on the work of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci argued that the struggle for "hegemony," as opposed to the struggle for "domination,"'8 ranged over a wide array of fronts. Hegemonic power was not something that rulers "held" over the ruled, but rather was the result of complex and shifting interactions between the dominant and the subordinate. Power, in this model, was not the provenance of a static ruling class but rather was theorized as transactional, a joint construction without a fixed or permanent location, inherently unstable and constantly shifting.19 Central to Gramsci's model was a practice of politics in which would-be hegemonic forces actively work in the domains of the economy, society, and culture in order to produce and secure power.20 The political struggle between hegemonic powers and subaltern resistant forces, proceeding across the vast array of modern institutions, spaces, and practices, was termed by Gramsci the "war of position."21 Culture-an essential element in the struggle for gaining the consent of the ruled, always working together with and indissoluble from coercion-was deemed integral to such political processes. 
